Layer 2 VPNs have been in our lives for a few decades now. Whatever the underlying technology used (VPLS, VPWS etc.), it is always based on a group of customer premises equipment (CPE) devices connected over fiber to an underlying MPLS/IP backbone via a group of Provider Edge (PE) routers.
About the Author
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System Architecture Department Manager at RAD
Alon Geva is System Architecture Department Manager at RAD’s headquarters in Tel Aviv. He was a member of the ITU-T SG15/Q13 group of experts and the owner of various patents in the field of digital communications. Alon’s previous positions include Principal Algorithms Engineer in a VDSL technology development group and Synchronization & Timing expert, both at RAD. He holds a BSc and MSc in Electrical Engineering. His areas of interest include SDN and NFV, communications security and encryption, and timing & synchronization.
In his spare time, Alon is an enthusiastic photographer who likes mixing his love for photography with world-wide travel (https://500px.com/alogev).
All Posts by Alon Geva
- Sep 23, 2019
- Mar 25, 2019
- Mar 18, 2019
In part 1 and 2 of this blog series, we discussed the issue of authentication between the uCPE and the different network ZTP entities and explained why and how the use of X.509 certificates brings great simplification to this problem. In this third part, we will touch upon another “painful” topic that is also related to ZTP: Software licensing.
- Mar 11, 2019
The first part of this blog series laid the foundation of the security issues involving uCPE ZTP over public networks (and also in general). We also discussed the issue of authentication between the uCPE and the different network ZTP entities.
- Mar 04, 2019
In this blog series, we will focus on zero-touch provisioning (ZTP) for uCPEs over a public network. In particular, we will discuss the two main challenges of security (parts 1 and 2) and licensing (part 3). Part 4 of this blog will explore RAD’s uCPE ZTP solution in detail. A device MAC address or manufacturer serial number are usually not considered, on their own, a secured-enough identity, as in many cases they can be forged quite easily.
- Jan 21, 2019
In part 1 of the blog post, we have discussed microburst origin as well as effect. We have also explained why all existing microbursts quantification methods fail, in one way or another, to yield a true measurement of microburst within a given network.
- Jan 14, 2019
Financial, government, mobile and other traffic flows are often bursty when transported across networks or in data centers.
- Oct 15, 2018
In this part, we would like to focus on the means to achieve the required timing accuracy goals. In particular, we would like to discuss the distributed PTP Grandmaster (GM) concept that is usually also associated with PTP-GM miniaturization.
- Oct 08, 2018
Delivering sub-microsecond time accuracy to cellular base stations was one of the major challenges that cellular providers faced as they started to deploy their new LTE networks. This was further exacerbated by LTE-A’s stringent synchronization requirements and, now when 5G is at our doorstep, time accuracy requirements are being “stretched” again, challenging the boundaries of what physics can deliver.